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 ABSTRACT. There is a clear tendency in contem-
porary political/legal thought to limit agency to indi-
vidual agents, thereby denying the existence and
relevance of collective moral agency in general, and
corporate agency in particular. This tendency is ulti-
mately rooted in two particular forms of individualism
– methodological and fictive (abstract) – which have
their source in the Enlightenment. Furthermore, the
dominant notion of moral agency owes a lot to Kant
whose moral/legal philosophy is grounded exclusively
on abstract reason and personal autonomy, to the
detriment of a due recognition of the socio-histor-
ical grounds of moral social conduct. 
I shall argue that an adequate theory of responsi-
bility is needed, which does not only take into
account individual responsibility, but also collective
and corporate responsibility, capable of taking into
consideration society and its problems. Furthermore,
corporations are consciously and carefully structured
organisations with different levels of management and
have clearly defined aims and objectives, a central
feature upon which I shall be focussing in this paper.
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1.  Introduction
Is a corporation an entity in relation to whom
we can apply the ideas of moral responsibility
such as agency, rationality, and autonomy? How
can we apply responsibility and blame to a
corporation? For the upholders of the theory of
individual responsibility rooted in methodolog-
ical individualism and its related metaphysics,
one cannot ascribe moral responsibility to a
corporation, only to “flesh-and-blood” individ-
uals who are moral persons. However, I argue
that corporations have sufficient structural com-
plexity to be agents whom it makes sense to call
to account for their actions and them conse-
quences of those actions. It may not be possible
for corporations to be responsible in the way that
individuals can be, but they can be responsible in
a way appropriate to corporations.1
2.  A metaphysical issue: nominalist or 
2.  realist?
J. Braithwaite and B. Fisse in an article,
“The Allocation of Responsibility for Cor-
porate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and
Accountability” argues that methodological indi-
vidualism, especially the kind advocated by
Hayek amounts to a dualist ontology. On the one
side are individuals; on the other corporations.
Individuals are observable, and therefore, real;
corporations are abstractions without the possi-
bility of direct observation (Fisse and Braithwaite,
1998, p. 476).2 If it is so, it is not possible to
ascribe moral accountability3 to a corporation,
and ideas such as agency, autonomy and ratio-
nality do not apply to a corporation. John
Ladd appears to agree with this view, when he
says:
We cannot and must not expect formal organiza-
tions, or their representatives acting in their official
capacities, to be honest, courageous, considerate,
sympathetic, or to have any kind of moral integrity.
Such concepts are not in the vocabulary, so to
speak, of the organizational language game (Ladd,
1970, p. 499).
In the “game” of corporations moral responsi-
bility is a word without meaning.
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The debate around this problematic have two
contestants: nominalists and realists. For the
former, corporations are collections of individ-
uals, or aggregations of human beings.4 For the
latter, a corporation has an existence and a
meaning as well as a moral/legal personality of
its own. Both of these views have implications
for moral and legal responsibility. If we accept
that corporations are merely aggregations of indi-
viduals it is difficult to ascribe moral responsi-
bility. In this nominalist view, corporations do
not exist apart from its members; any blame-
worthiness or responsibility can only be obtained
from the culpability of an individual servant
or employee. This would leave one with the
problem of deciding whether the corporation
should be responsible for the behaviour of all of
its employees or only for some of them. On the
realist view, corporations do represent something
beyond individuals, which means that following
from this point of view, it may be possible to find
a new candidate for attributing responsibility. 
3.  Question of rational agency
Behind the controversy involving these two posi-
tions in metaphysics, stands another crucial but
related issue, namely, about rational agency. Can
we apply to a corporation, ideas such as, agency,
rationality, autonomy? 
Peter French first sets out the individualist
answer as follows:
(a corporation) is understood to be nothing more
than a contractual nexus, a collection of self-inter-
ested humans acting either as principals or agents
with respect to each other. . . . The agents, agency
theory assumes, only work for their principals
because of what those agents expect personally to
gain from the relationship. A corporation is but the
financial and contractual “playing field” for a
number of individual dealings, and it has no exis-
tence independent of those dealings (French, 1997,
p. 148).5
However, French goes on to reject it, and
argues that corporations are moral persons in the
sense that they are entities and they are inten-
tional actors. He sees corporations as entities
with dominant roles to play in our society.
Therefore, in this view, corporations are more
than mere collections of individuals, which
means that they are capable of moral decisions
and, hence, susceptible to moral blame
(Goodpaster, 1982, pp. 132–141). 
Every corporation creates a general set of policies
(as well as an image) that are easily accessible to
both its agents and those with whom it interacts.
When an action performed by someone in the
employ of a corporation is an implementation of
its corporate policy, then it is proper to describe
the act as done for corporate reasons or for cor-
porate purposes to advance corporate plans, and so
as an intentional action of the corporation (French,
1995, p. 27).6
From this point of view, one can say that cor-
poration’s social interactions with others fall, at
least, into four categories:
1. Interchanges between individual agents.
2. Corporations interacting with individual
agents.
3. Corporations interacting with other cor-
porations.
4. Corporations interacting with society.
As an example of the first category: Mr.
Ruben, one of the managers of Body Shop and
I meeting on a street of Manchester; the second:
the Body Shop billing me for a kind of skin
product and responding to my objections; the
third: the Body Shop arranging to bank with the
Co-op Bank instead of Barclays Bank; the fourth:
the Body Shop creating a school for handicap
children in Bangladesh.
Corporations in their relations and actions, as
is obvious, have far more power and control over
many others than individual agents because they,
by and large, structurally constitute the situations
in which individual agents have to operate and
make choices. For instance, in a recent article in
The Guardian, John Pilger wrote about the
inhuman conditions and low wages in which
people are forced to work and live, to be able to
survive under the dictum of globalisation where
big companies such as Gap or Nike exercise their
power, depriving the workers of a free and
dignified life.7
According to French all corporations have
internal decision structures (CID) that supply the
basis for attributing moral agency to them. He
identifies two elements in these structures, the
first is related to “an organizational flow chart”
and the second involves rules that enable one to
go between individual and corporate decisions
(1997). The CID structures have two kinds
of rules: organisational and policy rules. He
compares the former to the descriptive rules of
sport events, like the rules of a basketball game.
These organisational rules in corporations dis-
tinguish between and clarify the role of each
member, “delineate stations and managerial
levels, and plot the lines of authority, subordina-
tion, and dependence among and between such
stations and the organization” (French, 1996,
p. 41). The policy rules are what he calls, “recog-
nition” rules, because they provide “affirmative
grounds for describing a decision or an act as
having been made or performed for corporate
reasons in the structured way” (French, 1997,
p. 150). 
We can say with T. Brytting, that “together
they form the ‘letter’ and the ‘spirit’ of the
company” (2000, p. 89). It is even possible for
the CID structure to be so tightly construed that
individual responsibility and freedom no longer
makes sense. However, French argues that, in
practice, it makes sense to talk about actions,
which are informed by the corporation’s plans,
aims and interests beyond those of the individ-
uals who work inside the company. Under those
circumstances the corporation is a moral agent in
its own right with a strong sense of its corpo-
rate culture. The corporation identity depends
upon their ability to consolidate their culture in
terms of articulating a domain of shared meaning.
As Keith Pheby argues, “at the heart of this
structural closure lie processes of communication,
operating internally by defining a common con-
ceptual framework for the realisation of common
desires, and operating externally by a process of
reality construction which determines the organ-
isation’s mode of interaction with other systems
within its domain” (1997, p. 78).
4.  Corporate moral agency
Corporate moral agency enables the possibility
of describing an event in two ways: First, the
intentional action of the individuals, and second,
the intentional action of the corporation for
which the individuals work. This means that
intentionality is not only confined to the level
of the individual. Take a sentence like the fol-
lowing which one might read in the daily papers:
“Corporation X today signed an agreement with
Government Y to lower the price of certain
drugs it sells to Y”. The corporation in question
has certain rational goals in mind – for instance,
Government Y has already started legal pro-
ceedings against it for over-pricing, that Y has
threatened to take its custom to a rival, etc.
However, the corporation can only achieve its
goals and interests through the actions of certain
designated “flesh-and-blood” individuals. In the
example cited, its CEO, a certain Mr A would
have put his signature to the same document as
the Minister for Health of Y, a certain Mr B. Mr
A, not in his capacity as CEO of Y, but as a mere
shareholder of Y, might be very unhappy about
the corporation’s action, as he personally could
stand to lose out on his dividends as he has shares
in the corporation. The corporation’s interests
and goals could diverge from those of the indi-
vidual within the corporation in any one specific
context. All this means is that corporations
have rational reasons for behaving in certain
ways because they have interests in pursuing
their established corporate goals despite the tem-
porary, conflicting self-interests of managers and
directors. 
In this non-mysterious sense, we can say that
corporations are intentional actors, capable of
being motivated to respond not only to internal
challenges but also to external ones. As inten-
tional actors, why then should they not have
responsibilities? But responsibilities to whom?
Commonly, corporations are said to be respon-
sible to its shareholders; by this is meant that
should shareholders be displeased with their
annual dividends, they could sell off their shares,
or try to get rid of the CEO, etc. These actions
appear to cause no difficulty. No-body seems
to find it unintelligible to hold the “fat cat”
responsible for the slump in the corporation’s
fortune; some people find it, however, morally
offensive why “fat cats” in our present culture
are seemingly “rewarded” for their incompe-
tence. But the latter difficulty is only morally
bizarre; from the theoretical point of view of
holding someone responsible for the down-turn
in the corporation’s fortune, every one seems to
be clear that it is the CEO and/or other top
managers, rather than the porter at the front door
or no-one who could be said to be responsible. 
However, difficulties of an insuperable theo-
retical kind are alleged to arise the moment one
claims that corporations ought to be responsible
to a wider set of people, other than their share-
holders, such as their customers, citizens at large
who have to suffer the effects of their actions
(like polluting air, water, soil). Surely, this situa-
tion is analogous to holding the “fat cat” respon-
sible for incompetence by the morally bizarre act
of “rewarding” him/her for incompetence, as in
reality, he/she is being held responsible for the
incompetence. Sacking (or in polite speech,
“stepping down because of pressure”) constitutes
blame, even if the blame is sweetened by a fat
cheque.
Furthermore, these individuals are not
ordinary intentional actors, so to speak, but
owing firstly, to their power, their actions have
impact upon a large number of people. They also
have extensive resources enabling them to for-
mulate and articulate certain policies and strate-
gies, for carrying them out, as well as to monitor
their outcome.8
I argue that, admitting the above, then cor-
porations may even be held to a more stringent
level of responsibility than a mere “flesh-and-
blood” private citizen, as its field of action is
more embracing than that of individual agents.
This is the reason why French says:
Business firms in this century occupy social posi-
tions roughly equivalent to the prominent posts
held in other eras by the church, the nobility, the
army, even the feudal lords. They dominate the
lives of all but a few members of the community.
They control the financial and economic aspects
of society and are possessed of monetary power
far greater than the world’s governments. . . .
Corporations today enjoy the prestige associated
with creating and maintaining the scale or worth
against which the majority of adults in Western
societies judge their own value. . . . Corporations
are far from being social fictions (French, 1996,
p. ix).9
5.  Individualist critique
Nonetheless, this view has been subject to critical
scrutiny, namely by the individualist side.10 I
cannot discuss in detail all the different points of
each critique, but it is important to underline
that these positions consider French’s view to be
flawed, because he compares the corporation’s
capability of decision-making with that of the
human mind, implying that corporate inten-
tionality could be compared to human inten-
tionality. But his critics may have missed the
point, namely if corporations can act rationally
(and autonomously), it would follow that they
can be said to be moral agents.11
But how can this view be sustained against the
central charge mounted by the individualist
critique? Let us begin by setting out in brief an
analysis of what the individual theory of respon-
sibility could mean by the notion of human
agency. An individual is said to be an effective
agent if at least the following conditions obtain:12
1. He/she has desires and emotions.
2. He/she has knowledge of some (though
necessarily not all) of the causal connections
in the world in which he/she operates.
3. He/she can foresee (to some extent) the
consequences of his/her action. 
4. He/she is capable of formulating intentions
and plans based on 1, 2, 3.
The notion of (moral) responsibility may at the
same time be attributed only to those human
beings who satisfy the above. That is why, not
all human beings are moral agents13 – the very
young, for instance, do not qualify. Babies have
desires, of course, but these are very limited ones;
their knowledge of causal connections is again
at best absolutely minimal, although not totally
absent. In pre-modern times, animals were
credited with responsibility but since modernity,
they have not been so charged on the grounds
that, as they lack language, they are incapable of
being aware (in the way a normal human adult
is) of the consequences of their behaviour and,
therefore, of the harm they could cause to others.
Next, let us apply the criteria listed above to
a corporation. Surely, it is unproblematic to
admit that a corporation has desires, purposes and
goals (the key ones being to maximise profits and
growth), it can and must articulate and formu-
late intentions and plans, short- and long-term
(including its so-called “mission statement”), it
is capable of apprising itself of causal connections
in the domain in which it operates, it can foresee
and monitor (even to a greater extent, as we have
seen, than any ordinary intentional actor) the
consequences of its actions (although it may
choose to turn a blind eye to some of these, and
that is common enough). After all, a corporation
is not like a loose cannon, a somnambulist, a
baby, a mentally retarded or a mad person. As we
have already seen, it is essentially a clearly defined
organisation with stated aims and objectives, with
worked out strategies for achieving them, with
resources to monitor closely the impact of its
strategies on its customers, its competitors, on
governments, etc., and to take steps to revise its
strategies in the light of new developments,
social, political as well as scientific and techno-
logical (Donaldson, 1982). In the free market, no
corporation can be expected to survive unless it
adapts itself intelligently to the changing world
in which it operates. Could such an organisa-
tion not be said to be rational and autonomous
(its aims and objectives are, after all, self-chosen
and defined)? 
6.  Conclusion
I argue that the opponents of the notion of cor-
porate responsibility, in adhering to individu-
alism, have also failed to appreciate two things: 
(a) That the notion of a corporation cannot
be reduced to the mere behaviour of indi-
viduals (who are also abstract in character).
Under methodological individualism, the
corporation is simply an aggregate of such
individuals. However, under the alterna-
tive analysis proposed, the corporation
refers to an entity over and above a mere
aggregation of abstract/fictive individuals.
As we have also seen, the corporation has
a tightly focused structure and organisation
(CID) within which policies and strategies
are articulated, formulated, discussed, dis-
carded or endorsed and then implemented.
Obviously, only “flesh-and-blood” indi-
viduals can articulate, formulate, debate,
discuss, reject/endorse goals and the means
for executing them. But these “flesh-and-
blood” individuals are not fictive or
abstract individuals – they are people
acting within a certain social context, ful-
filling certain functions, carrying out
certain roles. 
(b) Under methodological individualism,
social phenomena are explained as the
accumulation of the unintended conse-
quences of individual actions, and there-
fore, no one single individual agent could
be blamed for the collective bad that might
ensue. Again, the theory of individual
responsibility implies a simple-minded
view of causation, namely, that the only
important type of action is the kind where
one individual can single-handedly and,
either deliberately or recklessly, bring
about the harmful bad consequence, such
as when someone, who had lost his
temper, deliberately drove the car over his
neighbour and killed her, or took the risk
of killing her by driving at her, but hoping
that she would leap out of his way in time.
But not all actions fall under this paradigm.
Ex hypothesi, collective bads do not fall
under it. Corporation A, which tips its
toxic waste of type A into the stream, may
not poison the stream when such an action
occurs in isolation from other like actions,
but if Corporation B also tips its toxic
waste of type B into the stream, and if
Corporation C similarly tips its toxic waste
of type C into the stream, etc., the stream
would be poisoned. Suppose that one were
to pose the simple-minded causal question
in turn regarding each of the corporations
involved: does the tipping of its toxic waste
cause the stream to be poisoned? The
answer, each time, would be no. It is, after
all, the accumulation of the unintended
consequences of their individual acts of
tipping their respective toxic waste, which
brought about the stream being poisoned.
(Furthermore, the various different types
of toxic waste may synergistically cause
poisoning of the stream on a greater scale
than it would have been the case if they
had all tipped out the same type of waste.)
So adhering to the theory of individual
responsibility would have let all the cor-
porations involved off the hook. But cor-
porations, as we have seen, have large
resources and given access to these, the
legal fiction of the “reasonable corpora-
tion” ought to apply. This is to say, that
each of them ought to have foreseen that
the tipping into the stream of its own toxic
waste could cumulatively lead to the
stream being poisoned, and therefore,
could reasonably be held culpable if people
died from drinking the water drawn from
the poisoned stream.
This paper has attempted to show that the
theory of individual responsibility, in spite of its
strengths, is necessarily inadequate outside its
limited domain of applicability. From its per-
spective, the notion of corporate responsibility
is unintelligible. As a result, societies and legal
systems – such as the one in England and Wales
– in which the theory holds sway, have great dif-
ficulties, both in theory and in practice, in under-
standing and accepting the notion of corporate
responsibility in moral as well as legal contexts.
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